Saturday, December 16, 2006

The Real Road To Victory

A busy week for me ends with more work, so my post for the week-end will have to be a cut-and-paste job. That doesn't mean, however, that it's not important. Far from it. When I read this this morning I was simply stunned. This essay is simply the single most important essay that has appeared in the MSM this year. (Just barely: the Washington Times has only recently begun to be identified in the MSM community as one of its own and not without reason.). I've highlighted the passages that were particularly of interest.

This is the way, folks. This is how we win. The enemy is split into two warring camps. Time to drop the universalist pretentions and get to business.

LET THE MUSLIMS FIGHT IT OUT

By Diana West
Funny thing about the recent op-ed by Nawaf Obaid in The Washington Post outlining likely Saudi actions if the United States withdraws from Iraq: namely, that Saudis would both support Sunnis in Iraq (versus Shi'ites supported by Iran) and manipulate the oil market to "strangle" the Iranian economy.

I think it sounds peachy, this let-them-devour-each-other strategy--which I'm guessing many Americans mutter to one another in frankness, if not also in confidence.

After the column appeared, not only did the Saudi government disavow it, but Mr. Obaid was fired from his job advising the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al-Faisal. Hmmm, thought Saudi-ologists.

Before anyone could say, "shifting desert sands," Mr. Turki resigned his post in Washington, hightailing it back to the so-called kingdom for reasons unknown but possibly concerning machinations related to securing the post of foreign minister long held by Mr. Turki's ailing brother, Prince Saud al-Faisal. The post is also coveted by former Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Hmmm again.

But now it seems the Obaid column "reflected the view of the Saudi government," after all. At least, that's the way the New York Times tells it. Meanwhile, the Associated Press is reporting that "private" Saudi money is already supporting Sunni forces in Iraq. According to the New York Times, this private funding could easily become official Saudi policy. While Saudi leaders say they have so far withheld support from al Qaeda-led Sunni groups in Iraq, the newspaper explains, "if Iraq's sectarian violence worsened, the Saudis would line up with Sunni tribal leaders"--al Qaeda or no al Qaeda. Meanwhile, we already know Iran is backing, if not guiding, Iraqi Shi'ites.

So what should we do?

I propose two options, neither of which has occurred to Iraq Study Groupies calling for peace parleys with Hezbollah boosters and Holocaust deniers, or to hawkish proponents of "winning" Iraq (or at least Baghdad) with more troops. But maybe that's because neither group dares to reckon with the two greatest obstacles to our efforts in the region: namely, Islam (culturally unsuited to Westernity) and our own politically correct ROE, or rules of engagement (strategically unsuited to victory).

The first option is military, but it carries a seemingly insurmountable cultural override. The fact is, the United States has an arsenal that could obliterate any jihad threat in the region once and for all, whether that threat is bands of IED-exploding "insurgents" in Ramadi, the deadly so-called Mahdi Army in Sadr City, or genocidal maniacs in Tehran. In other words, it's a disgrace for military brass to talk about the 21st-century struggle with Islam as necessarily being a 50- to 100-year war. Ridiculous. It could be over in two weeks if we cared enough to blast our way off the list of endangered civilizations.

As a culture, however, the West is paralyzed by the specter of civilian casualties, massive or not, that accompanies modern (not high-tech) warfare, and fights accordingly. It may well have been massive civilian casualties in Germany (40,000 dead in Hamburg after one cataclysmic night of "fire-bombing" in 1943, for example) and Japan that helped end World War II in an Allied victory. But this is a price I doubt any Western power would pay for victory today.

So, the military solution--which isn't the same as boosting ROE-cuffed troop levels in Baghdad--is out, unless or until our desperation level rises to some unsupportably manic level. The great paradox of the "war on terror," of course, is that as our capacity and desire to protect civilians in warfare grows, our enemy's capacity and desire to kill civilians as a means of warfare grows also. Our fathers saved us from having to say, "Sieg Heil," but what's next--"Allahu akbar"?

Not necessarily. There's another Middle Eastern strategy to deter expansionist Islam: Get out of the way. Get out of the way of Sunnis and Shi'ites killing each other. As a sectarian conflict more than 1,000 years old, this is not only one fight we didn't start, but it's one we can't end. And why should we? If Iran, the jihad-supporting leader of the Shi'ite world, is being "strangled" by Saudi Arabia, the jihad-supporting leader of the Sunni world, isn't that good for the Sunni-and-Shiite-terrorized West?

With the two main sects of Islam preoccupied with an internecine battle of epic proportions, the non-Muslim world gets some breathing room. And we sure could use it--to plan for the next round.

Thursday, December 14, 2006

Why We Are Losing In Iraq

From the website The Captain's Journal, a non-military website that posts frequently on military affairs and whose author has many NCO contacts in theatre in Iraq:
The military has also tightened rules of engagement as the war has progressed, toughening the requirements before a sniper may shoot an Iraqi. Potential targets must be engaged in a hostile act, or show clear hostile intent.

The marines say insurgents know the rules, and now rarely carry weapons in the open. Instead, they pose as civilians and keep their weapons concealed in cars or buildings until just before they need them. Later, when they are done shooting, they put them swiftly out of sight and mingle with civilians.

Rules of Engagement: The U.S. soldier and Marine shall fight by rules easily manipulated by jihadi forces

It goes on:
From Observation Post Blazer, marines view Fallujah through a thick sheet of bullet-proof glass--already tested with numerous impacts. Or they stare through night-vision goggles or a thermal imaging scope that can pick up the heat of a dog hundreds of yards away.

The marines still patrol key roads. The US military, which still travels boldly through town despite a surge in deadly sniper attacks and roadside bombs, is spending $200 million on 60-plus projects to rebuild the city, heavily damaged in fighting two years ago.

But with just 300 marines, the US military footprint is smaller in this Sunni stronghold of more than 300,000 than it has been in two years. As the marine presence shrinks and Iraqis take more control, Fallujah--once a template for counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq, where US forces have controlled all the variables--is likely again to set a standard for the rest of the country.

"A lot of us feel like we have our hands tied behind our back," says Cpl. Peter Mattice, of Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment. "In Fallujah, [insurgents] know our [rules of engagement]--they know when to stop, just before we engage."

Rules of Engagement: The US soldier and Marine must be badly outnumbered and must patrol in the open, presenting an easy target, while the enemy can control the terms of the engagement through unilateral acts that act to "stand down" US forces adhering to artibtrary political rules.

It gets worse. From an NCO who served a year in Ramadi, on the ever-present danger of suicide bombers in cars/trucks:
My unit, as well as the thousands of other soldiers in our area dealt with these problems on a daily basis. The "details" of the ROE changed daily. Some examples… For a time, the gunners would bring buckets full of rocks into the turret with them to throw through the windshields of vehicles not adhering to our warnings to stay away (that ended quickly after command had to pay for numerous windshields). We put signs in Arabic/Kurdish/Turkish on the backs of the vehicles warning them to stay away. We fired warning shots. We did nothing. We drove in the center of the road and dominated our routes by running ignorant drivers right off the road. We drove with the flow of traffic and narrowly averted disaster numerous times.


It is frankly immoral and criminal to ask American military personnel to conduct a war in such an environment.

In war, the side that can control when and where operations will occur has an enormous advantage. It is clear as day that these "rules" are easily manipulated.

You don't need to be a genius to figure it out. Base yourself in a Mosque, after getting some local "cleric" to declare it the 76th Most Holy Site in All of Islam. Spead your fighters out. Have them constantly walking in clothing that could conceal weapons. Have some of them armed, some of them not. Direct these men so there is constant inter-action between them and the US forces. Some walk into their path, get challenged, only found to be found unarmed. Some walk nearby, then turn around abruptly.

Every hour of every day, you are forcing US soldiers to make split-second decisions. They will feel the pressure, knowing that every day they face death and, if they make the wrong decision, that their own press will "Abu Ghraib" them and their own leadership will ship them to Leavenworth.

Meanwhile, run cars near convoys using the same concept. Some with lone men, others with families. Some come near, then leave. Others turn away quickly when spotted. Cause confusion and uncertainty in the crusader/infidel ranks.

Then, after a few weeks prep, after they get tired of all the near misses, you hit them. They will hesitate and you will get them. And the next day, your patient work of two weeks pays off as the AP headline hits America:

5 GIs Killed in Anbar Province.

Wednesday, December 13, 2006

Fantasy and Reality

Fantasy is the President saying that the Sunni "vice-president" of Iraq is a real political leader who believes in the nation-state of Iraq and the Sunni, Shi'ites and Kurds united therein.

Reality is a sectarian killing by a bomb set to explode among job-seekers shattering over 60 human bodies.

Fantasy is our leading generals lining up on television to explain that there is no military victory, only a political one which will be achieved if only we have a few more years on the ground.

Reality is that we've been in Iraq longer than it took to defeat the Axis.

Fantasy is asking Americans to sacrifice their lives for the belief that the Arab and Muslim people desire liberty.

Reality is that Americans are mere targets who can be killed at will by an enemy ruthless enough to know our beliefs are nothing more than tarted-up weakness.

Fantasy is that Iraq, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China and the European Union will all act in the better interests of the Iraqi and the American people.

Reality is that they will look after their own while we do not.

Fantasy is that the Saudis have another peace plan.

Reality is that Saudi clerics continue to raise money and lavish praise on the Sunni killers of Baghdad.

Fantasy is the Secretary General of the United Nations saying this:
Fourth, states must be accountable to each other, and to a broad range of non-state actors, in their international conduct.

My fifth and final lesson derives inescapably from those other four. We can only do all these things by working together through a multilateral system, and by making the best possible use of the unique instrument bequeathed to us by Harry Truman and his contemporaries, namely the United Nations.

Reality is the United Nations, in the face of jihadi genocide, doing this:
The United Nations Human Rights Council agreed on Wednesday to send a mission to assess the human rights situation in the strife-torn Sudanese region of Darfur, council president Luis Alfonso de Alba said.

The resolution was adopted by consensus by the 47-member Council following a tense two-day special session. "It is so decided," de Alba said.

The mission will be headed by the UN Special Rapporteur on Sudan and "five highly qualified persons" to be appointed by the president of the council after consultation with other members, according to a draft text released by the United Nations.

The decision came after an often fractious debate which again saw a fault-line emerge between Western members of the council on one side, and African and Islamic states on the other.

Western countries, backed by Secretary General Kofi Annan and the Human Rights Commissioner Louise Arbour, insisted any mission should involve the UN's human rights expert on Sudan and composed of specialists.

African states had sought to have de Alba at the head of the mission alongside other diplomats.

The mission will "assess the human rights situation in Darfur and the needs of Sudan in this regard," the text of the draft decision said.

Human rights groups and mainly Western officials regarded the special session as a test of the council's credibility, after Annan warned that it had not paid sufficient attention to rights violations in Darfur.

"It is essential that this council send a clear and united message to warn all concerned, on behalf of the whole world, that the current situation is simply unacceptable and will not be allowed to continue," Annan said Tuesday.

The reality is that the killing in Iraq, the continuing deterioration of American standing and power in the world, the continuing strength of the jihadist movement and the continuing jihadist genocide in Sudan will get worse.

Until we make the collective decision to stop living in a fantasy world.

UPDATE: I love Gen. McCaffrey and would follow him into battle without question. But, goddamn it, this essay of his today in the Washington Post is a prime example of the level of fantasy that has taken hold of our debate.

First, the general advances this:
There is a better option. First, we must commit publicly to provide $10 billion a year in economic support to the Iraqis over the next five years. In the military arena, it would be feasible to equip and increase the Iraqi armed forces on a crash basis over the next 24 months (but not the police or the Facilities Protection Service). The goal would be 250,000 troops, provided with the material and training necessary to maintain internal order.

Then, without so much as realizing the implications of what he is saying and how it affects his first point, he advances this:
Lack of combat experience is not the central issue Iraqis face. Their problems are corrupt and incompetent ministries, poor equipment, an untrained and unreliable sectarian officer corps (a result of Rumsfeld's disbanding the Iraqi army), and a lack of political will caused by the failure of a legitimate Iraqi government to emerge.

C'mon people! Focus!