Saturday, January 14, 2006

The Red Line

Iran broke open internationally monitored seals on at least three of its nuclear facilities on Tuesday, clearing the way for uranium enrichment activities that Europeans and Americans say are a crucial step toward making a nuclear weapon.

-- Report, January 11, 2006, New York Times

European officials warned that Tehran would have to reinstate the seals at its Natanz research facility and refrain from all the activities it announced this week if it wanted to avoid a UN referral. "We made clear in December they had to retain the full suspension. Removing the seals [at the Natanz plant] was the critical step. They've crossed the red line," said one diplomat. "A half-step back will not stop us [in seeking a UN referral]."

-- Report, January 11, 2006, Financial Times


Bible-thumping and neo-conservative morons that we are, conservatives have viewed the diplomatic initiative launched by Britain, France and Germany (known internationally in connection with this effort as the "E3") to curtail Iran's nuclear programme with a mix of contempt and satisfaction. The contempt part is easy enough to comprehend; given the modern conservative understanding of Islamism as a form of volkish fascism with a religious overlay conservatives view negotiations with Islamists with about as much respect as the world today holds for the British and French negotiations at Munich with the last wave of fascism.

That's easy enough to understand. But where does the satisfaction come from?

It must be regrettably admitted that there is in human affairs no satisfaction quite like that of seeing others fail due to their refusal to heed our advice. Whether it be loved ones or hated enemies, we always seem to carry within ourselves an inherent "know-it-all-ism" that feeds itself on the fruits of wasted efforts contrary to our thoughts and wishes. This is an altogether contemptible impulse and one that must be watched closely. If the Iraq War has taught conservatives anything it should teach us above all that there are certain things that even a forthright and clear-headed worldview can miss, one of which is certainly the immense soft power of culture.

(To his credit, one anti-war conservative, George Will, swam against this tide when he noted, in response to neo-con theories about the implanting of the habits of liberty in the parched soil of the Middle East, that there were patches of the South Bronx that seem to have remained resistant to those particular habits even after being part of the United States for over 200 years. It seems to me that that particular lesson, while capable of being blown up into an all-purpose argument for perpetual inaction, is one that conservatives would do well to keep in mind.)

Still, watching the E3 have talks, talks about having talks and further talks about entering into negotiations that would lead to talks, while all the while the Islamic Republic was stating forthrightly that it would never agree to give up its right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to engage in peaceful nuclear pursuits-the stated aim of the E3 powers in entering into the talks in the first place-produced the requisite schadenfreude conservatives always get when liberal fantasy meets the harsh light of day. It comes as no surprise to us conservatives, sad to say, that the whole sorry exercise now appears to even the German Foreign Ministry as nothing more than a sham designed to buy time by the mullahs in Tehran.

And now, sayeth the European diplomats, a "red line" has been crossed. It appears that Iran has found the game tiresome. So tiresome, in fact, that it didn't even bother to show up to the latest IAEA meeting last week to explain itself.

However, rather than representing the crossing of some red line drawn on the Quai d'Orsay, the Iranian actions are simply more of the same: they have said they would act thus, and thusly they have acted.

Or, as the Great Mark Steyn put it, Iran's position has always been "Give us the right to go nuclear, or we'll go nuclear." Either way you go, you get the same result. There isn't much to admire in fascism, but the fact that its always clear on its goals and acts with enormous self-confidence is beyond doubt.

The press, or, to be more exact, the European press is now breathlessly reporting that Iran's actions have proven so "provocative" that there is now no alternative but to "report" Iran to the Security Council. In fact, Prime Minister Blair told Parliament (he still speaks there?) today that he not only expected to do so, he expected the entire E3 will act as one on this front.

That remains to be seen. It wouldn't be the first time a straight-forward Prime Minister of the U.K. has been left with egg on his face after finding his rear left unguarded by French and German forces. Perhaps Chancellor Merkel or deVillepin will decide that Guantanamo is an issue more worthy of their time than another round of Security Council inaction.

But let us assume that this is so. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the E3 has finally had enough, admits its diplomatic initiatives have failed, and joins the US in convincing the IAEA board to submit the Iran issue to the Security Council. What then?

In order to answer that question, first one must take notice of certain facts on the ground, so to speak. Let's walk through them:

First, it is clear that the Islamic Republic has in the past lied and cheated under the NPT. This is not (as it is often portrayed in the European press) an assertion of the United States Government, but of the IAEA itself. In its Resolution of September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors noted that:
The Board of Governors,

(a) Recalling the resolutions adopted by the Board on [various dates],

(b) Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty,

(c) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding safeguards issues in Iran and to verify the implementation by Iran of the suspension,

(d) Recalling Iran's failures in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 214) with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material had been processed and stored, as reported by the Director General in his report GOV/2003/75 dated 10 November 2003 and confirmed in GOV/2005/67, dated 2 September 2005,

(e) Recalling also that, as deplored by the Board in its resolution GOV/2003/81, Iran's policy of concealment has resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with its Safeguards Agreement,

(f) Recalling that the Director General in his report to the Board on 2 September 2005 noted that good progress has been made in Iran's correction of the breaches and in the Agency's ability to confirm certain aspects of Iran's current declarations,

(g) Noting that, as reported by the Director General, the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important outstanding issues after two and a half years of intensive inspections and investigation and that Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue,

(h) Uncertain of Iran's motives in failing to make important declarations over an extended period of time and in pursuing a policy of concealment up to October 2003,

(i) Concerned by continuing gaps in the Agency's understanding of proliferation sensitive aspects of Iran's nuclear programme,

(j) Recalling the emphasis placed in past resolutions on the importance of confidence building measures and that past resolutions have reaffirmed that the full and sustained implementation of the suspension notified to the Director General on 14 November 2004, as a voluntary, non legally binding confidence building measure, to be verified by the Agency, is essential to addressing outstanding issues,

(k) Deploring the fact that Iran has to date failed to heed the call by the Board in its resolution of 11 August 2005 to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment related activities including the production of feed material, including through tests or production at the Uranium Conversion Facility,

(l) Also concerned that Iran has to date failed to heed repeated calls to ratify the Additional Protocol and to reconsider its decision to construct a research reactor moderated by heavy water,as these measures would have helped build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme,

(m) Noting that the Director General reported that the Agency "continues to follow up on information pertaining to Iran's nuclear programme and activities that could be relevant to that programme" and that "the Agency's legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is limited" (GOV/2005/67),

(n) Endorsing the Director General's description of this as a special verification case, and

(o) Noting that the Agency is still not in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,

1. Finds that Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT SafeguardsAgreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute;

2. Finds also that the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities referred to in the Director General's report, the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency's verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;

* * *

(I apologize for the length of that quotation, but understanding its contents is crucial to any understanding of this issue.)

The bottom line here is that the IAEA has declared, at a minimum, that the government of the Islamic Republic has: 1) failed its obligations under the NPT, 2) has a policy of concealment with regard to those failures, and 3) not allowed inspection to a point where the IAEA ceases to have concerns raised by those past failures.

Once again, it's important to realize and to remember that none of these conclusions have been reached by the United States Government or scary neo-cons with Jewish names like Wolf-a-Witz. They are by and large shared by the USG, but they have not been advanced by the USG as the main accusatory body against Iran on this issue.

Second, the United States was convinced by the arguments of the E3 that it is the Europeans and not the Americans who will take the lead on this issue. (Note: I finally saw a liberal bumper-sticker in Portland I can get my arms around: "Not Every Problem Has An American Solution"). This has been abundantly clear and has been completely and totally communicated to our European allies as a whole, and not just the E3.

A frankly remarkable and must-read interview given by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel back in October buttressed this point with good, old-fashioned Rummy directness:
SPIEGEL: How concerned are you about Iran?

Rumsfeld: All of us have to be concerned when a country that important, large and wealthy is disconnected from the normal interactions with the rest of the world. They obviously have certain ambitions, powers and military capabilities ...

SPIEGEL: ...and nuclear ambitions...

Rumsfeld: That's apparently what France, Germany, the UK and the International Atomic Energy Agency have concluded. Everyone wants to have the Iranians as part of the world community, but they aren't yet. Therefore there's less predictability and more danger.

SPIEGEL: The US is trying to make the case in the United Nations Security Council.

Rumsfeld: I would not say that. I thought France, Germany and the UK were working on that problem.

SPIEGEL: What kind of sanctions are we talking about?

Rumsfeld: I'm not talking about sanctions. I thought you, and the U.K. and France were.

SPIEGEL: You aren't?

Rumsfeld: I'm not talking about sanctions. You've got the lead. Well, lead!

SPIEGEL: You mean the Europeans.

Rumsfeld: Sure. My Goodness, Iran is your neighbour. We don't have to do everything!

SPIEGEL: We are in the middle of regime change in Germany...

Rumsfeld: ... that's hardly the phrase I would have selected.

Rumsfeld has been roundly criticized by many for the various failures of the Iraq War, but an interview like this also reveals his many advantages, not the least of which is the very un-European tendency to blurt out the cold, hard truth even when it is definitely declasse to do so.

Third, now that the matter is reaching the crisis point, the European reaction, so typically foreshadowed in the Der Spiegel questioner's lame excuse making about the current ability of the Merkel administration to handle such a task, is beginning to shift rapidly in its old, tired-and very predictable-manner. Already, just a few days into this "red line" crisis and the various news stories and diplomatic pronouncements out of Europe suggest that somehow, magically, now the U.S. is responsible for taking the lead out of the crisis. Where once the headlines screamed "E3" is now substituted "U.S." Where once we read a quote from Jack Straw, we now get them from Condi Rice.

This would be tolerable were to Europeans to admit forthrightly that their approach has failed, the Americans were right all along and, now, as a result, we are now planning a united front. That, however, is apparently too much to ask for. Instead, now that the responsibility-passing stage has been met, the Euro press is now full of "Gosh, I Sure Hope The Stupid Fucking Americans Don't Get Us Into Another War This Time Round" memes.

Typical of the genre is this unintentionally funny op-ed by (all good Englishmen have three names) Timothy Garton Ash of The Guardian, entitled "Let's Make Sure We Do Better With Iran Than We Did With Iraq." After proving his bona fides by agreeing that Iran has acted horribly and represents a unique threat, he writes:
So what should Europeans and Americans do on the edge of this Persian precipice? Here are a few things for starters. First, Europeans should take the threat of an unpredictable, fragmented Islamic revolutionary regime obtaining nuclear weapons very seriously indeed. Europeans led the movement against nuclear arms escalation by the superpowers in the 1980s; today's threat of nuclear proliferation is probably more dangerous. Americans, for their part, should not confuse European warnings about the need to proceed cautiously with cowardice, euroweeniness, and all those other failings of "cheese-eating surrender monkeys" attributed to us by red-blooded American anti-Europeans.

Well, alright then, we shall proceed cautiously. So what does Timothy Garton Ash suggest we actually do, cautiously or otherwise? The remainder of this essay concludes:

Second, we should share all the information, knowledge and intelligence that we have. The US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, has observed that Iran is unique among the countries of the world in that the US has so little direct contact with it. The US has had no diplomats there since the end of the embassy hostage crisis a quarter-century ago. It has very few businesspeople or journalists there. And, if James Risen's State of War, is to be believed, the CIA managed to shop its whole network of agents in Iran to the Tehran authorities by inadvertently sending a list of them to a double-agent. So they don't even have any spooks there. The Europeans, by contrast, have diplomats, businesspeople, journalists and possibly also spooks aplenty in Iran, and so should be better informed.

We need to share all this information and reach a common analysis. And before we take any step in the diplomatic dance, we need to ask ourselves two questions: how will this affect the Iranian regime, and how will it affect Iranian society? The regime is complex. Ahmadinejad is the president, but not the ultimate boss. The boss of this theocratic regime is the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khameini. Without his say-so, the nuclear seals would not have been broken. But he is constrained by strong interest groups, such as the Revolutionary Guards, and by other ayatollahs, such as the president's fundamentalist guru, Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi.

As important is the dynamic within Iranian society. I feel deeply uncomfortable when I hear the American neoconservative Frank Gaffney calling for a revolution in Iran. It's so brave of him to risk other people's lives. Iranians would do well to remember what happened to their fellow Shias in the south of Iraq when the last President Bush encouraged them to rise up at the end of the Gulf war. But it is the case that Iranian society is potentially our greatest ally - indeed, probably the most pro-western society in the Middle East outside Israel.

As far as I can tell from this intrepid action plan we are to share information, use diplomacy, share information, hope crazy Iranian impulses are constrained internally and ally ourselves as much as possible with "Iranian society."

Nope, no euroweeniness there.

In short, we are seeing a precise re-run of the run-up to war in Iraq, which was caused largely by the exact same abdication of responsibility by the Europeans. We must proceed (cautiously, of course) under the assumption that the Europeans will be of absolutely no help whatsoever, not even the British, and that they will content themselves with relying on Sheriff Bush while all the while hating his guts and preparing international law briefs against him.

So: what is to be done?

As I have long argued, a good many of the strategic and military challenges the United States finds itself facing today are largely a result of Imperial over-reach. Much of it is not our fault, at least not directly, as that over-reach was a response to the unique challenge the Soviet Union and the Cold War posed to the Free World. However much we may understand how it came about, however, doesn't help to disguise the lethargy and weakness in the states under Uncle Sam's protective bubble have become, both culturally and militarily. Until and unless the U.S. begins to demand that other world powers assume responsibilities commensurate with their economic and political status, the U.S. will continue to be the world's policeman and greatest criminal at the same time.

Fortunately for us, the "Red Line" crisis provides an important and once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for the U.S. to break the pattern of dependency that allows once grown-up countries like France and Germany to sulk like teen-age children while living off of "Daddy's" labor.

For the Iranian regime threatens Europe much, much more than it does us. While it must be admitted that the Tehran regime reflects a grave threat to the national security of the United States, it is not so grave that the U.S. can't postpone action for some years. After all, the conventional wisdom that there isn't any viable military option here is just plain wrong. The U.S. hasn't even begun to scratch the surface of its war-fighting capabilities yet in the War on Terror and could muster up enormous resources if the reality of the situation really led us to war again. Given Iran's history with the American people, it's real nuclear programme and the statements of the Iranian regime, there isn't a President who, given the proper handling, couldn't rouse the American people to war in the face of this very real threat.

However, if the U.S. were to back off, not support or take the lead in IAEA referrals and defer leadership to the E3 in the Security Council, and were it to take a hard Rumsfeldian line towards the Europeans ("Well, lead!"), it would slowly dawn on them that they had better do something, and fast. The wonders that would do to the health of the European mindset would be amazing. There would be trauma, and temper tantrums at first, of course. After all, we are talking about Europeans. But, eventually, they would act in their national interests.

In other words, Mongo is riding into Rock Ridge.

And, unlike the movie, it would be a very good idea if Sheriff Bart's office was empty for a while.